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ABSTRACT 
 
This study discusses regulatory options that federal and state legislatures might consider for the payday loan 
industry. These options include outright prohibition; restricting the implicit annual percentage interest rate; limiting 
the amount per loan; limiting the number of concurrent loans; setting lower and upper limits on contract length; 
and defining the waiting period between loans. While other studies examining the payday loan industry have relied 
on user survey data or data from a specific lender, this study utilizes data collected by the administrative agent for 
all payday loan activity in several states, including Florida, Illinois, and Oklahoma. A comparison of key empirical 
results derived from the differing regulatory environments in these states provides guidance to those who consider 
imposing further regulation. The current regulatory constraints have resulted in a relatively low default rate, a high 
rate of loan denial, and a troubling industry reliance on the frequent borrower. An analytical framework is 
suggested for understanding the motivations of the low and high frequency borrowers.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
ayday loans are small, short-term loans made to individuals who in turn deliver to the lender a post-
dated check for the principal and interest. This post-dated check is frequently described in the 
regulatory literature as a deferred deposit. When the loan matures, presumably on the next payday 
when funds are available, the borrower’s check is deposited for collection. The industry has seen significant growth 
since its inception in the early 1990s. According to the industry trade group Community Financial Services 
Association of America (2017), there are currently 20,600 payday advance locations in the U.S., providing $38.5 
billion in short-term credit to some 19 million households.  
 
The typical payday loan amount is $300 for a term of two weeks at a fee of $15 per $100 borrowed. Annualizing this 
cost leads to an annual percentage rate (APR) of 390%. Resulting from such high implicit APRs, as well as from the 
perception that consumers become trapped in a cycle of payday loan borrowing, legislators in 15 states and the 
District of Columbia have effectively barred payday lenders from the state. They have done so by setting restrictive 
interest rate caps or through prohibition of lending secured by a deferred deposit (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2012). 
Nevertheless, according to industry critic Martin (2011), the continued success of the payday loan industry in states 
where conditions have allowed it to operate should place it on the short list of targets for the newly established 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)—created as part of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act.  
 
In addition, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) organized Operation Choke Hold in 2013 as an effort to 
deprive payday lenders of vital banking services (Wall Street Journal 2016). Using the regulatory powers of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve, banks providing 
loans and services to payday lenders would receive additional scrutiny. The CFPB (2016) has also considered 
imposing regulations that would require payday lenders to consider a borrower’s ability to repay, and that would 
deny approvals to borrowers who cannot afford full repayment of the loan when due.  
 
Barring a change in consumer credit markets, any proposed restrictive regulations or limits on bank services to 
payday lenders would immediately impact those borrowers confronted with financial stress and seeking a 
P 
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convenient short-term loan. In 2010, over 12 million borrowers in the United States used funds derived from a 
payday loan (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2012).  
 
The following sections consider the regulatory options that federal agencies such as the Consumer Finance 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) or state legislatures might impose on the payday loan industry, with the aim of providing 
guidance for the imposition of further regulations. These options include outright prohibition; restricting the implicit 
APR; limiting the amount per loan; limiting the number of concurrent loans; setting lower and upper limits on 
length; and extending the waiting period between loans. While most other studies examining the payday loan 
industry have relied on user survey data or data from a specific lender, this study extends the work of Anderson and 
Jackson (2010) by utilizing data collected by Veritec Solutions LLC, the state designated administrative agent for all 
payday loan activity in several states including Florida, Illinois, and Oklahoma. 
 
2. PROHIBITION OF THE PAYDAY BUSINESS MODEL 
 
There are two critical pieces to the business model of the payday lending industry: (1) the ability to make a small 
short-term loan at a relatively small fee, but one that translates into a very high APR, and (2) the lender’s ability to 
secure the loan with a post-dated personal check from the borrower that covers both principal and fees. In states 
where payday lenders do not operate storefronts, this deferred deposit requirement is explicitly prohibited and/or the 
APR cap is set well below the rate at which payday lending is feasible. For example, New York State eliminated 
payday lending by disallowing the use of a post-dated personal check as the basis for a loan and by limiting the APR 
to 25%. To comply with this APR cap, a two-week payday loan of $100 would generate 96 cents of fee income to 
the lender.  
 
At the federal level, the U.S. Congress effectively excluded lenders from offering a traditional payday loan to 
military personnel through the Military Authorization Act of 2007. The Act prohibits loans to members of the 
military with an APR exceeding 36%, and further bans lenders from requiring a deferred deposit or other access to 
the borrower’s account as security.  
 
A number of industry studies have concluded that legislation to effectively eliminate payday lenders would provide 
substantial consumer benefits, despite removing a significant source of funds for those confronted with financial 
stress. For instance, Stegman and Faris (2003) conclude that the payday business model turned a significant number 
of consumers in North Carolina from occasional borrowers into chronic borrowers at high cost to themselves. 
Further, in a comparison of areas with and without borrower access to payday loans, Melzer (2011) find that access 
to payday lenders led to a number of negative consequences. Payday borrowers were less able to pay their 
mortgages and make timely rent and utility payments. They were also more likely to delay medical and dental care 
and less likely to make necessary prescription drug purchases. 
 
On the other hand, studies have concluded that payday lending provides certain consumers with beneficial loans not 
available elsewhere. Edmiston (2011) notes that consumers in low-income areas without access to payday loans are 
forced to seek even more costly sources of credit. These costly alternative sources include loan sharks, pawnbrokers, 
cash advances on credit cards, and frequently resorting to defaulting on checks (i.e., having insufficient funds 
available). He reports that after payday lending was banned in Georgia and North Carolina, households defaulted 
more on checks, made more complaints to the FTC about lenders and debt collectors, and were more likely to file 
for bankruptcy. Fusaro (2008) estimates an implicit APR exceeding 4,000% for funds obtained by a bounced check 
after all penalties and fees are assessed. In Oregon, restrictions on payday lending terms caused former payday 
borrowers to shift to bank overdrafts and late bill payments (Zinman 2010). In a similar vein, and using evidence 
from the financial impact of natural disasters in California, Morse (2011) concluded that the availability of payday 
loans mitigated the incidence of foreclosure and resulted in fewer larcenies—presumably due to the greater availably 
of legally obtainable funds. Lawrence and Elliehausen (2008) observed that the high satisfaction expressed by 
payday loan borrowers could be attributed to having greater control over their finances than they would otherwise 
have.  
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3. CONSTRAINTS ON PAYDAY LENDING 
 
Rather than outright prohibition, the majority of states have opted to regulate the payday loan industry in ways that 
allows it to continue, and in most cases, thrive. The usual forms of regulation involve some combination of limits on 
the (1) loan fee, (2) number of outstanding loans, (3) amount per loan, (4) minimum and maximum loan length, and 
(5) minimum idle time—the gap between paying off one loan and opening another. A comparison of the scope of 
regulation in Illinois, Florida, and Oklahoma is given in Table 1 (Appendix A). Florida sets the maximum fee at 
10% of the loan amount, Illinois at 15.5%, and Oklahoma has a sliding scale of 15% for the first $300 and 10% of 
the loan amount above $300. 
 
The maximum loan size in Florida and Oklahoma is $500 while in Illinois it is $1,000. Both Oklahoma and Illinois 
allow a borrower to have two concurrent outstanding loans, while Florida allows only one—thus, the maximum 
indebtedness is $500 in Florida and $1,000 in the other two states. In Oklahoma, a borrower must wait 13 days after 
paying off one loan before she can open another. Wait periods are one day and seven days in Florida and Illinois, 
respectively. In addition, a second loan is denied in Illinois if the potential borrower has had a payday loan 
outstanding for 45 consecutive days or more. This wait time between loans is generally referred to as “the cooling-
off period.”  
 
All three states specify certain considerations to a borrower in the event that a deferred deposit check is rejected due 
to insufficient funds. As detailed in Table 1, Florida and Illinois provide a grace period for repayment without added 
fees, while Oklahoma requires that lenders accept repayment on an arranged installment basis. 
 
A common concern expressed about payday lending is the so-called credit trap. It may start with a very financially 
constrained consumer needing a short-term loan to then find that, given her tight budget, the only way to repay is to 
take out an additional loan—and she consequently becomes trapped in a seemingly endless cycle of borrowing. A 
mechanism to break this cycle would be invaluable to those in such circumstances; a provision to be able to convert 
into an installment loan—as in Oklahoma—would seem very desirable. 
 
3.1. Regulation of Loan Size 
 
Despite the variation in regulatory restrictions, the average loan amount is relatively stable within the $340-$385 
range, as shown in Table 2 (Appendix A). As expected, the average loan amount in Florida is somewhat higher than 
the averages in Oklahoma and Illinois since only one outstanding loan at a time is allowed in Florida, as opposed to 
two in the other states. The ability to get a second loan in the near future in Oklahoma and Illinois reduces the 
incentive to get as close to the loan limit as possible.  
 
The results also strongly suggest that a payday borrower may have a certain critical payment in mind when 
arranging for a loan—be it to pay for an emergency repair or to make a mortgage, rent, utility, or auto loan payment. 
The maximum loan limit in Illinois is $1,000—twice the limit in the other two states—yet the average loan size in 
Illinois remains comparable in the $340-$385 range. If regulators have a goal of reducing the average size of a 
payday loan, the limit would have to be set well below $500, although a loan limit of $300 or less may have adverse 
effects on the financial stability of these borrowers.  
 
Restricting the size of subprime loans is also an effective way to reduce the risks from moral hazard and adverse 
selection. Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009) suggest that individual borrowers are more likely to default on larger 
loans due to moral hazard, because they do not internalize the full increase in default costs that arise as loan size 
increases. In addition, loan caps prevent high-risk borrowers from joining the client pool due to adverse selection. 
These borrowers would be attracted by the possibility of obtaining very large payday loans, which they are unlikely 
to repay.  
 
3.2. Limiting the Number of Outstanding Loans  
 
Although Florida restricts a borrower to one loan at a time, Oklahoma and Illinois allow for two concurrent loans. 
As expected, some consumers will choose to negotiate a second loan while still obligated for the first. Data collected 
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from Oklahoma for 2006-2009 and presented in Table 3 (Appendix A) reveal that approximately 24% of borrowers 
reached the two-loan limit at some time during the year.  
 
For borrowers with multiple loans outstanding, the average indebtedness far exceeds that for the borrower with one 
outstanding loan. For every month that data was collected, the second outstanding loan more than doubled the 
borrower’s payday loan balance. For example, in March 2009, borrowers with one loan had an outstanding balance 
of $380.34, while the outstanding balance for borrowers with two loans was $798.04 as seen in Table 3.  
 
These findings indicate that a rule prohibiting concurrent payday loans would impact a significant share, but not the 
majority, of borrowers in states that currently permit up to two concurrent loans. Borrowers denied a second loan 
will likely not change the amount per loan, but may reduce by half their maximum outstanding payday loan debt 
during the year. Whether this step increases consumer welfare depends on the alternative strategies that these 
borrowers are forced to adopt to meet their financial needs, once denied a second payday loan.  
 
There is some evidence that allowing a second concurrent payday loan puts additional stress on the ability of the 
borrower to repay. In Table 5 of Appendix A, the percentage of returned (bounced) checks and the percentage of 
loan losses to fees are shown for Florida and Oklahoma. Since Florida permits only one outstanding payday while 
Oklahoma allows two, we would expect that Florida would have fewer returned checks and a lower ratio of loan 
losses to fees. The results in Table 5 are mixed with regard to returned checks. For the Jan 2008 to May 2009 
interval, 4.8% and 5.3% of checks were returned in Florida and Oklahoma, respectively. The numbers are exactly 
reversed for the Sept 2005-August 2006 interval. For the interval covering approximately mid-2006 to mid-2007, 
both states had a 4.8% returned check rate.  
 
The results in Table 5 for the percentage of loan losses to fees are clearer. The loss ratio for Oklahoma is greater 
than Florida in all three time intervals, though the difference is declining. In the Sept 2005-Aug 2006 interval, the 
loss ratio in Oklahoma was 22.8%, which was 3.1% higher than in Florida. However, by June 2008-May 2009 it had 
fallen to 17.5%, which was only 0.1% higher than Florida’s. In the most recent time period, lender risk associated 
with payday loans, as measured by returned checks and loan losses, has not markedly increased by allowing two 
open loans rather than one.  
 
Limiting both loan size and the number of concurrent loans places a strict limit on the maximum indebtedness of a 
payday borrower at any point in time. The maximum payday debt would be $500 in Florida and $1,000 in Illinois 
and Oklahoma. While some payday borrowers may struggle to break out of the cycle of payday indebtedness, these 
limits seem modest compared to recent estimates that households with credit card indebtedness have an average 
balance of $15,799 (Woolsey and Shulz 2012). There is some evidence, measured by lender loan losses, that 
borrowers permitted to have up to two concurrent payday loans have greater difficulty to meet their financial 
obligations to the lender.  
 
3.3 Constraining Borrower Eligibility  
 
Eligibility for a payday loan is firstly determined by criteria set by the lender, and secondly by the state regulatory 
administration. A lender typically requires a borrower to be employed or have a steady income, a checking account, 
and be at least a certain age. For example, CashAdvance (2013), an online agent for multiple payday lenders, 
requires evidence of (1) employment for 90 days or more in the current job, (2) income of at least $1,000 per month 
after taxes, (3) a valid checking account, (4) home and work phone numbers, and (5) age of at least 18 years. 
 
For the three states included in this study, the loan application is sent on approval by the lender to the state’s 
designated payday loan clearinghouse to determine whether the eligibility requirements described in Table 1 are 
met. A loan application would be rejected if it would exceed the maximum number of outstanding loans or the 
maximum loan amount, if it would be made prior to the end of the minimum waiting period, or if it would result in 
total outstanding payday loans exceeding the set maximum amount. In addition, an application for a second payday 
loan is denied in Illinois if the borrower has a loan that has been outstanding for 45 days or more. The declined 
eligibility ratios, measured as denied applications to total applications, are shown in Table 4 (Appendix A) for 
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Florida, Illinois, and Oklahoma. For all three states, close to 20% of payday loan applications are deemed ineligible 
by the state regulatory administration.  
 
Following state precedents, federal regulators may wish to set guidelines that states must follow regarding eligibility 
requirements such as extending the minimum waiting period between loans, establishing the maximum length of a 
loan, limiting the number of outstanding payday loans, and restricting the length of continuous time for which a 
borrower may have an outstanding payday loan. If deemed a positive step for public policy, more stringent 
requirements would certainly increase the current rejection ratio of 20% for loan applications in these states.  
 
A decision to set national guidelines for a payday loan is plausible given the CFPB’s efforts in the area of residential 
mortgages. It has completed the drafting of the terms for a standardized “qualified” mortgage (QM) that would 
certify that the agreement is fairly priced and the borrower has the ability to repay (Morgan, 2013). Extending this 
concept to the development of a “qualified” payday loan may follow, since major criticisms by consumer advocates 
of the payday loan industry are similar to those of subprime mortgage lenders in that loan terms are inherently 
“unfair, abusive, and deceptive” (Martin 2011). 
 
4. REGULATION AND LOAN FREQUENCY 
 
Advocates of the payday loan industry often emphasize the borrower’s need for a readily available source of funds 
in an emergency, despite their high cost. Such a loan at a critical moment may allow a consumer to avoid the 
seriously disruptive consequences derived from missing a monthly mortgage, rent, utility, or auto loan payment, or 
from having an overdrawn bank account. In reality, access to payday lending as a loan of last resort during a period 
of financial crisis does not correspond to actual use by most of its borrowers. As shown in panel (a) of Table 6 for 
the 2007-2009 time period, relatively few borrowers negotiated only one loan during a year; these “emergency” 
borrowers accounted for a small percentage of the industry’s business. For example, for the June 2008-May 2009 
period, 15.1% of borrowers in Florida took out just one loan; these loans accounted for only 1.8% of the total loans 
made. During the April 2008-March 2009 period, 11.5% of Oklahoma’s borrowers took out one loan, and these 
loans accounted for only 1.2% of the total borrowed. A greater percentage (25.3%) of borrowers in Illinois made one 
payday loan during February 2006-December 2008. These one-time borrowers still accounted for only 4.3% of the 
total loan volume. 
 
The frequency statistics in panel (a) of Table 6 indicate that a payday loan is for many consumers far from an 
unusual event, and is integrated into their normal pattern of financial transactions. In Florida, 22.3% of borrowers 
took out 10-15 payday loans during June 2008-May 2009. The percentage of borrowers with 10-15 loans in 
Oklahoma from April 2008-March 2009 was 22.9%, and in Illinois from February 2006-December 2008 the 
percentage was 9.8%. 
 
The cumulative frequency statistics shown in panel (b) of Table 6 confirm the reliance of the payday loan industry 
on frequent repeat users for a major portion of its loan volume. In Florida, borrowers who took out 13 payday loans 
or more from June 2008-May 2009 represented 24.0% of borrowers but 52.0% of loan volume. Similar results are 
found in Oklahoma, where borrowers with 13 or more loans accounted for 26.8% of users but 54.3% of loans from 
April 2008-March 2009. The pattern in Illinois is consistent as borrowers with more than 13 loans from February 
2006-December 2008 accounted for 13.1% of users, yet 44.8% of loan volume.  
 
The repeated use of payday loans—even by households who hold credit cards—is perplexing to some observers. 
Agarwal, Paige, and Tobacman (2009) found in their dataset that a majority of payday borrowers with a major credit 
card still had substantial credit card liquidity available at the time of the payday loan. They speculate that consumers 
place high value on their remaining credit card liquidity, with payday loans used strategically to protect that liquidity 
despite their significant cost. 
 
Strong evidence that many consumers rely on multiple payday loans during the year, and that the industry is 
dependent on these high-turnover consumers, is observed in all three states examined in this study. These 
phenomena appear to be unrelated to regulatory variations in the waiting period between loans, loan fees, number of 
outstanding loans permitted, and total continuous time allowed in a payday loan. Somewhat similar results were 
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found by Kaufman (2013) using cross-sectional data from several states on loans from one payday lender. He found 
only modest reductions in loan frequency, with longer waiting periods and restrictions on the number of outstanding 
loans.     
 
Our findings are somewhat different from Kaufman (2013) with respect to his emphasis on the importance of lower 
interest rate caps in increasing the frequency of the loan rate. As shown in Table 1, payday loans in Florida have 
lower interest rate caps as well as a shorter cooling-off period, and approximately the same term loan limit as those 
in Oklahoma. Based on these factors, following Kaufman (2013), Florida should have higher loan frequency rates 
than Oklahoma. However, the results in Table 6 for the 2008-2009 period show that 15.1% of Florida’s borrowers 
made only one payday loan compared to 11.5% in Oklahoma; in addition, 2.3% of Florida borrowers had 25 or more 
payday loans compared to 4.6% in Oklahoma. The explanation for the lower borrower frequency rate at these 
extreme frequency levels is that Florida allows only one outstanding loan at a time while Oklahoma permits two. 
The restriction in Florida to allow only one outstanding loan appears to offset the state’s lower interest caps and the 
shorter waiting time between loans.  
 
A comparison of the frequency distribution of loans between Oklahoma and Illinois provides an important insight 
into future regulatory considerations on term limits. Both states have comparable rate caps and allow two 
outstanding loans and similar cooling-off periods, but have quite different term limits on a payday loan. Oklahoma 
restricts the term of a loan to a range of 12 to 15 days, while the proscribed range in Illinois is 13 to 120 days. The 
longer-term limit in Illinois appears to have a strong effect on the frequency distribution by allowing borrowers to 
stretch out the repayment rather than renewing or rolling over every two weeks. The results in Table 6 show that 
borrowers in Illinois with only one or two payday loans during the entire February 2006-December 2008 time period 
accounted for 52.4% of users, while borrowers who took out only one or two loans in Oklahoma during the shorter 
period from June 2006-May 2007 accounted for merely 29.9% of total users. Allowing states to extend the term 
limit on payday loans may reduce the incentive for borrowers to keep coming back for a renewal or rollover; 
however, longer term loans may well lead to higher delinquency rates as interest cost mounts.  
 
Francis (2010) sees the repeat payday loan borrower as being overly optimistic, and as having imperfect self-control 
and a distorted sense of the discounting process (the time value of money). Her advice for the regulatory agency is to 
modify user behavior by providing a potential borrower with greater disclosure on the real cost and dangers of 
payday loans, information on the number of payday loans she has already negotiated, and distributing personal 
narratives of consumers who have been trapped into perpetual rollovers. 
 
Although the frequency data raises public policy issues regarding the appropriate use of payday loans by repeat 
borrowers, it should be recognized that relatively few loans in Florida and Oklahoma go into default. The evidence 
on checks declined due to insufficient funds is presented in Table 5, where the return check rate as a percentage of 
total transactions ranges from 4.8% to 5.0% in Florida and from 4.8% to 5.3% in Oklahoma. This default rate is 
consistent with that of leading credit issuers as measured by the 2006 year-end 4.17% rate on Fitch’s Prime Credit 
Card Chargeoff Index (Business Wire 2008). Despite the low default rate and high APRs on payday loans, lenders 
still have the incentive to proceed with caution in approving applications. As shown in Table 5, loan losses in each 
state represent a significant portion of fees collected, with the loss to fee ratio ranging from 17.4% in Florida to 
22.8% in Oklahoma. 
 
The presence of the high frequency borrower in a variety of state regulatory environments will certainly elicit a 
future response from state and federal regulators. Following Stegman and Faris (2003), regulators may encourage, or 
even require, credit unions, banks, and thrifts to supply consumer-friendly short-term loans that are “payday loan-
like.” It is not immediately clear how helpful this would be, since several key banks—including the Bank of 
America and Wells Fargo & Co.—already offer a comparable product commonly referred to as a direct-deposit 
advance. With this product, the borrower receives the loan proceeds directly into a deposit account at the bank and 
then, at payday, the loan plus fees is automatically withdrawn from that account. While there is still the risk that the 
consumer could have lost their job in the interim, this product clearly has a lower default risk compared to a payday 
loan. 
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Anderson and Jackson (2010) suggest an alternative framework for understanding the frequency of use statistics by 
segmenting the demand for payday loans into (1) emergency borrowers, (2) strategic borrowers, and (3) line-of-
credit borrowers. Any regulatory reforms must be cognizant of the role a payday loan has in meeting these needs. 
For a financially vulnerable household, a convenient payday loan may be essential to meet the expenses of an 
unexpected event. For the strategic borrower who may use a payday loan on a regular basis, it is often a cost-
effective alternative to defaulted check fees imposed by the bank and the check recipient, fees for late payment of 
credit card balances, and high upfront fees on credit card advances. The very high frequency user of payday loans in 
Oklahoma or Illinois, for example, effectively establishes a very costly $1,000 line of credit for these consumers. 
Nevertheless, it is an indicator of the high value placed by the high-frequency borrower on maintaining a minimal 
level of liquidity. Payday loans are used to shield their remaining liquid assists or the unused portion of their credit 
card limit. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Proposals for additional federal and state intervention into the payday loan industry should consider the regulatory 
environments in Florida, Illinois, and Oklahoma, where lenders have met the demand for short-term funds by 
households with subprime credit while limiting the rate of default. Payday lenders can continue to operate payday 
loans within the context of industry-specific interest rate caps, limits on maximum loan size, waiting periods 
between loans, a limit on the number of loans outstanding and on continuous days. These restrictions do have a 
sharp impact on loan volume. Approximately 20% of loan applications in all three states are denied due to non-
compliance with state regulations. 
 
Limiting the number of outstanding payday loans to one loan would also affect a significant number of borrowers 
and reduce by half their maximum outstanding loan balance. Frequency of use evidence for all three states shows 
that the payday loan industry depends heavily on the high frequency borrower for income, rather than the borrower 
needing a loan for the rare emergency event. Regulators may address this issue by simply limiting the number of 
payday loans negotiated by a borrower during a calendar year or 12-month period. However, the cost of alternative 
sources of funds may result in a reduction of consumer welfare. There is some evidence that less restrictive term 
limits on a payday loan would reduce the number of loan renewals and roll-overs that generate these very high user 
frequency rates.  
 
There are a number of ways to understand the high frequency borrower. Critics see this as evidence that the payday 
loan model is designed to catch consumers in a spiral of increasing debt. However, Edmiston (2011) finds that 
consumers with access to payday loans have higher credit standings than those without access. Anderson and 
Jackson (2010) suggest that the high frequency users treat their payday loans as a high-cost line of credit. Given that 
many payday loan borrowers have substantial credit card liquidity and other liquid assets, it appears that a payday 
loan may be seen by some consumers as a cost-effective option compared to other high-cost alternatives, and is 
being used strategically to maintain a critical level of liquidity. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Tables 
 
 
Table 1. Comparative Regulations of Payday Loans in Florida, Oklahoma, and Illinois 
Regulation Florida Oklahoma Illinois 
Maximum Loan  Size $500 $500 $1 000 
Maximum Open Loans 1 2 2 
Maximum Loan Balance $500 $1 000 $1 000 
Loan Term Limits (days)  7-31 12-15 13-120 
Minimum Waiting Period Between Loans (days)  1 13 7 
Maximum Marginal Interest Rate    $1-$300 10.0% 15.0% 15.5% 
$301-500 10.0% 10.0% 15.5% 
Average $3.00 $0.20 None 
Verification Fee 14 Day Loan APR    $100  338.9% 396.3% 404.1% 
$300  286.8% 392.8% 404.1% 
$500  276.4% 339.9% 404.1% 
Non-Payment Options 60 days grace (no added fees) 
Installments 
(added fees) 
56 days grace 
(no added fees) 
Source: Veritec Solutions LLC: Florida trends in deferred presentment (various years); Illinois trends in payday lending (October 2006); 
Oklahoma trends in deferred presentment (various years) 
 
 
Table 2. Transactions, advances, and fees (comparable 12 month periods) 
State Period Beginning 
Period 
End 
Number of 
Transactions 
Total Advance 
(million $) 
Total Fees 
(million $) 
Average 
Loan 
Average 
Fee/Loan 
Florida June 2008 May 2009 6,187,992 $2,380.0 $236.0 $384.55 $41.15 
Oklahoma April 2008 Mar 2009 1,058,067 $405.7 $54.3 $353.44 $54.30 
Illinois Jan 2008 Dec 2008 314,629 $116.30 $17.9 $369.88 $57.02 
Florida Sept 2006 Aug 2007 5,847,840 $2,000.0 $216.0 $386.28 $41.52 
Oklahoma June 2006 May 2007 1,056,192 $383.10 $50.7 $362.89 $48.01 
Illinois Jan 2007 Dec 2007 382,407 $140.00 $21.6 $365.69 $56.52 
Florida Sept 2005 Aug 2006 4,550,976 $1,730.0 $186.5 $381.25 $40.98 
Oklahoma Sept 2005 Aug 2006 1,021,829 $362.3 $47.8 $354.54 $46.93 
Illinois Jan 2006 Dec 2006 497,546 $167.6 $25.6 $336.93 $51.58 
Source: Veritec Solutions LLC: Florida trends in deferred presentment (various years); Illinois trends in payday lending (October 2006); LLC 
Oklahoma trends in deferred deposit lending (various years) 
 
 
Table 3. The multiple outstanding loan factor in Oklahoma 
Open 
Loans 
Number 
Borrowers 
% 
Borrowers 
Number 
Loans 
% 
Loans 
Total Loan 
Balance 
% Total 
Balance 
Average 
Balance 
(a) March 2009 
1 83,295 77.7% 83,295 63.6% $31,680,162 62.5% $380.34 
2 23,852 22.3% 47,704 36.4% $19,035,074 37.5% $798.04 
Total 107,147 100.0% 130,999 100.0% $50,715,236 100.0%  (b) May 2007 
1 73,713 75.9% 73,713 61.2% $27,209,105 60.1% $369.12 
2 23,415 24.1% 46,830 38.8% $18,093,042 39.9% $772.21 
Total 97,128 100.0% 120,543 100.0% $45,302,147 100.0%  (c) August 2006 
1 68,105 76.2% 68,105 61.5% $24,633,102 60.2% $361.69 
2 21,294 23.8% 42,588 38.5% $16,259,617 39.8% $763.58 
Total 89,399 100.0% 110,693 100.0% $40,892,719 100.0%  Source: Veritec Solutions LLC: Oklahoma trends in deferred deposit lending (various years) 
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Table 4. Declined loans to total applications 
State Period Beginning 
Period 
Ending 
% Declined 
Applications 
Florida June 2008 May 2009 18.7 
Oklahoma April 2008 Mar 2009 17.1 
Illinois Mar 2007 Feb 2008 20.0 
Florida Sept 2006 Aug 2007 19.1 
Oklahoma June 2006 May 2007 18.6 
Illinois Feb 2006 Mar 2007 20.0 
Source: Veritec Solutions LLC: Florida trends in deferred presentment (various years); Illinois trends in payday lending (October 2006); 
Oklahoma trends in deferred deposit lending (various years) 
 
 
Table 5. Returned checks and loan losses in Florida and Oklahoma 
State Period  Beginning 
Period 
End 
Number of 
Transactions 
Returned 
Checks 
Loan Loss/ 
Total Fees 
Florida June 2008 May 2009 6,187,992 4.8% 17.4% 
Oklahoma April 2008 Mar 2009 1,058,067 5.3% 17.5% 
Florida Sept 2006 Aug 2007 5,201,816 4.8% 19.2% 
Oklahoma June 2006 May 2007 1,056,192 4.8% 21.6% 
Florida Sept 2005 Aug 2006 4,550,976 5.0% 19.7% 
Oklahoma Sept 2005 Aug 2006 1,021,829 4.8% 22.8% 
Source: Veritec Solutions LLC: Florida trends in deferred presentment (various years); Oklahoma trends in deferred deposit lending (various 
years) 
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Table 6. Frequency and cumulative frequency distributions of payday loans 
(a)Frequency distribution of Use 
 
State 
Florida Oklahoma Illinois 
Number 
of 
Loans 
June 08-May 09 July 07-June 08 April 08-Mar 09 June 06-May 07 Feb 06-Dec 08 
% 
Users 
% 
Loans 
% 
Users 
% 
Loans 
% 
Users 
% 
Loans 
% 
Users 
% 
Loans % Users 
% 
Loans 
1 15.1 1.8 16.1 2.0 11.5 1.2 13.2 1.5 25.3 4.3 
2-3 16.5 4.8 17.3 5.2 15.4 6.6 16.7 4.5 27.1 11.0 
4-6 16.7 9.8 17.1 10.2 18.4 9.1 17.9 9.8 18.6 15.5 
7-9 13.3 12.6 13.0 12.7 13.4 11.6 12.8 11.2 10.0 13.4 
10-12 14.4 19.0 13.6 18.5 14.5 17.2 13.0 15.9 5.9 11.0 
13-15 7.9 12.8 7.7 13.0 8.4 12.4 8.0 12.3 3.9 9.2 
16-18 5.9 11.9 5.6 11.5 5.9 10.6 5.8 11.0 2.7 7.8 
19-21 4.5 10.6 4.3 10.5 4.8 10.3 4.8 10.6 1.8 6.1 
22-24 3.4 9.6 3.3 9.3 3.1 7.8 3.2 8.0 1.3 5.0 
25+ 2.3 7.1 2.0 7.1 4.6 13.2 4.6 15.2 3.4 16.7 
  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
(b) Cumulative Frequency Distribution of Use 
 State Florida Oklahoma Illinois 
Number of 
Loans 
June 08-May 09 July 07-June 08 April 08-March 09 June 06-May 07 Feb 06-Dec 08 
% 
Users 
% 
Loans 
% 
Users 
% 
Loans 
% 
Users 
% 
Loans 
% 
Users 
% 
Loans 
% 
Users 
% 
Loans 
1 15.1 1.8 16.1 2.0 11.5 1.2 13.2 1.5 25.3 4.3 
2-3 31.6 6.6 33.4 7.2 26.9 7.8 29.9 6.0 52.4 15.3 
4-6 48.3 16.4 50.5 17.4 45.3 16.9 47.8 15.8 71.0 30.8 
7-9 61.6 29.0 63.5 30.1 58.7 28.5 60.6 27.0 81.0 44.2 
10-12 76.0 48.0 77.1 48.6 73.2 45.7 73.6 42.9 86.9 55.2 
13-15 83.9 60.8 84.8 61.6 81.6 58.1 81.6 55.2 90.8 64.4 
16-18 89.8 72.7 90.4 73.1 87.5 68.7 87.4 66.2 93.5 72.2 
19-21 94.3 83.3 94.7 83.6 92.3 79.0 92.2 76.8 95.3 78.3 
22-24 97.7 92.9 98.0 92.9 95.4 86.8 95.4 84.8 96.6 83.3 
25+ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Veritec Solutions LLC Florida trends in deferred presentment (various years); Illinois trends in payday lending (October 2006); Veritec 
Solutions LLC Oklahoma trends in deferred deposit lending (various years) 
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NOTES 
